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I. Introduction
A widely accepted model of American legal history is that
“classical” legal thought, which dominated much of the
nineteenth century, was displaced by “progressive” legal thought,
which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this
day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on par with
Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both
progressive liberals who defend this revolution1 and by classical
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law & History, University of
Iowa.
1. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870–1960
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9–63 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING
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liberals who lament it.2 Nevertheless, the model seriously
misinterprets the legal revolution that occurred in the early
twentieth century.
We identify classical legal thought with efforts to systematize
legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural
sciences in the early nineteenth century.3 This methodology
sought not only simplification and classification, but also
“formalism,” in the sense that it presented the law as a complete
system.4 At the risk of some caricature, the “data” of this system
were legal decisions—a model that reflected not only the
penchant for classification but also commitment to law as
essentially judge-made and evolving over long historical
development. Historicism became an important attribute of legal
classicism.5 The authors who are held up as exemplars of classical
legal thought include such people as Gilded Age Harvard Law
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell6 and Francis Wharton, an
Episcopal priest and prolific legal writer who produced
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE
(1992); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3
(1980). See also Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming
Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452 (2015) (reviewing RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR
LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014)).
2. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014); DAVID
N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
(2011); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014).
3. See generally GEORGE H. DANIELS, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF
JACKSON 102–18 (1968); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN
AMERICA, 1800–1860 (1978).
4. See DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND
THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 2 (2013) (discussing historiciam in Gilded
Age American legal thought).
5. See generally id.
6. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW:
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 114–16 (2015) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP, OPENING]; CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871).
THE
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commentaries on many legal subjects.7 While classical legal
thought was generally anti-statist on economic matters, it was
not libertarian. In fact, it advocated heavy state regulation of
morals even as it supported liberty of contract without state
interference as a general matter.8 The anti-legislative bias of
legal classicism readily accommodated doctrines such as economic
substantive due process, which originated in the state courts and
was prominent in Supreme Court doctrine for the first four
decades of the twentieth century.9
The classical-to-progressive model of historical explanation is
far too narrow to account for the transformative, broadly
supported changes in American law that occurred during the
decades straddling 1900. A wide spectrum of jurists and legal
thinkers, both liberal and conservative, embraced these changes.
Classical legal thought would have collapsed even if progressives
had never showed up.
This vision of a classical–progressive dichotomy persists,
however, because it serves the interests of both the defenders and
opponents of the institutions we associate with progressive legal
thought—namely, state involvement in wealth distribution,
increasing public involvement in economic development, the rise
of regulatory agencies with broad quasi-judicial and quasilegislative powers, deferential judicial review of economic
legislation, and aggressive judicial review of government actions
injuring discrete and insular minorities.
American law experienced important changes during the
period from the Gilded Age through the New Deal. In piecemeal
7. See Stephen A. Siegel, Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy: God, Historical
Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal Thought, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 422, 422
(2004) (describing Wharton’s legal scholarship). See generally FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1846);
FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES
(1877); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1874);
FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1882); FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1st ed. 1872).
8. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–62 (discussing state
regulation of morals as part of substantive due process).
9. See id. at 243–77 (discussing the development of substantive due
process as part of legal classicism).
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fashion, private law gradually shifted away from common law
dominance and towards an age of statutes, which makes dating
this change next to impossible. By contrast, the date for the
revolution in public law is often conveniently stated as 1937,
when the Supreme Court switched positions on both state10 and
federal11 economic regulation. A year later, the Supreme Court
announced that federal economic legislation would from that time
be treated deferentially, although legislation that injured
powerless minorities would be treated more harshly.12 These
views were cemented into constitutional law when President
Roosevelt succeeded in filling nearly every seat on the Supreme
Court with New Deal supporters.13
Setting 1937–1938 as the birth date for progressive public
law is problematic, however. Important events occurred much
earlier. Throughout the nineteenth century, state and local
governments were actively involved in the regulation of health,
safety, and morals.14 In the late nineteenth century this
regulation reached more expansively to purely economic labor
protection and licensing.15
In 1905, Justice Holmes complained in his Lochner v. New
York16 dissent that the revolution had already occurred: the
10. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (“The
community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable
employers.”).
11. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937)
(noting that Congress had the power to pass the National Labor Relations Act
and upholding a decision of the NLRB).
12. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
13. Hugo Black (August 1937), Stanley Reed (January 1938), Felix
Frankfurter (January 1939), William O. Douglas (April 1939), Frank Murphy
(January 1940), James F. Byrnes (June 1941, succeeded fifteen months later by
Wiley B. Rutledge), Robert H. Jackson (July 1941), and Chief Justice Harlan
Fisk Stone (July 1941).
14. See generally HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–62; WILLIAM J.
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
15. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–77 (discussing the
development of substantive due process and labor policy in the nineteenth
century); MASHAW, supra note 14, at 227–51 (discussing the development of the
administrative state during the Gilded Age).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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majority’s decision striking down a ten-hour law for bakers “is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain.”17 Further, Holmes acknowledged, he
himself was uncertain about the theory. “I should desire to study
it further and long before making up my mind.”18 However,
accepting or rejecting the legitimacy of the underlying economic
theory was not part of his role as a judge.19 Over the next thirty
years, the Supreme Court struck down several state statutes and
some federal ones, implicitly rejecting this emergent economic
theory, but many of the statutes were overturned by very narrow
majorities, particularly those involving state law.20
The record on federal legislation also shows a much earlier
evolution. First, the history of federal railroad regulation and the
Interstate Commerce Commission stretches back to the 1880s,21
and of antitrust enforcement to the 1890s.22 In 1918, the Supreme
Court struck down the first federal child labor statute under the
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, applying the welldeveloped
distinction
between
“commerce”
and
“manufacturing.”23 The decision was 5–4, however, which was a
different judicial split than the 8–1 decision that had applied that
same rationale in an antitrust case twenty-three years earlier.24
17. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
19. See id. (“But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law.”).
20. See generally id.; Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(striking down a minimum wage statute for women); Morehead v. New York ex
rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking down a minimum wage provision).
21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:
Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017–20 (1988)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict] (describing the development of
railroad regulation during the Gilded Age); MASHAW, supra note 14, at 3–5, 189
(discussing the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission in developing the
modern administrative state).
22. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937,
at 241–340 (1991) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE] (discussing the origins
of the antitrust movement).
23. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
24. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.”).
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Seven years before that, the Court was unanimous in applying
that rationale to upset a federal statute that regulated both
locally produced liquor and that shipped across state lines.25
Other doctrines used to strike down federal legislation, such as
limitations on congressional power to delegate authority to
agencies, enjoyed more widespread support—such as the 8–1
decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan26 and the unanimous
decision in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States.27
Legal and constitutional history writing about the rise of
progressive legal thought has tended to focus on the changing
political environment, rather than nonlegal causes whose
influence was much broader. Those historians who looked to
nonlegal sources generally saw the most important as Darwinian
evolutionary theory and the social science ideas that grew out of
it—particularly reform Darwinist sociology, instrumentalism,
Freudianism, and genetic determinism.28
But Darwinian ideas hardly serve to divide progressive from
classical legal thought. Indeed, the conservatives who reacted
against progressive economic legislation in the early twentieth
century were often characterized as Social Darwinists—even by
Justice Holmes. He quipped in his Lochner dissent that the
Fourteenth Amendment did “not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics.”29 Beginning with Edward S. Corwin and Richard
Hofstadter in the 1940s, historians from the mid-twentieth
century saw economic substantive due process doctrine and the
progressive reaction as a debate about Darwinism.30 Henry Steele
25. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (“Manufacture is transformation—
the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of
commerce are different.”).
26. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
27. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 53–74.
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD.
82–90 (1941); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT,
1860–1915 (1944) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM]; HOVENKAMP,
OPENING, supra note 6, at 23–24; ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895 (1960); HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880’S, at 82–90, 372–73 (1950); BENJAMIN
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Commager concluded that Holmes was “obviously wrong” and
that the majority really did believe the Fourteenth Amendment
enacted a form of Social Darwinism.31 While I believe this
characterization of substantive due process is incorrect,32 the fact
remains that it represents an important rejection of the idea that
the resistance to the progressive revolution came mainly from
“classical” legal thought. Darwin and its social science
implications were just as inconsistent with and threatening to
classical legal doctrine as progressive legal thought was.
Further, Darwin was hardly the only—or even the
dominant—source of the revolution. Economic thought also went
through a profound revolution in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and in ways that were to have a broad and
lasting impact on legal policy. While the progressive direction of
legal thought has produced plenty of critics, almost no one wants
to roll the clock back on the marginalist revolution in economics.
The impact of marginalism reached much more broadly than to
self-styled progressives.33 As a result, the classical–progressive
dichotomy gets the distribution of legal views very wrong. Most
legal conservatives or libertarians who were literate in economics
also embraced the marginalist revolution.
Today the term “neoclassical” refers to economics since the
rise of marginalism. The term is helpful because it realistically
suggests a blending of old and new ideas rather than a complete
rejection of everything that had gone before. For the most part,
neoclassical economics preserved classicism’s preference for
market exchange and private ownership. At the same time,
however, the neoclassical conception of the market was far more
complex than the classical conception, and the tools for market
analysis became more technical.34 In the process many of the

TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT (1942).
31. COMMAGER, supra note 30, at 372–73.
32. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 417–20 (1988) (discussing the limited influence of
Social Darwinism on legal thought in the Gilded Age).
33. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 13–35, 75–90.
34. See id. at 32–33, 96–97.
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classical conclusions about the value of competition and the harm
caused by monopoly were preserved but qualified.
The same thing is true of the largely simultaneous revolution
in legal thought. For that reason the term “neoclassical” seems
preferable to the term “progressive” here as well. Neoclassical
legal thought included an expanded conception of market failure,
a larger ratio of legislation to common law rules, and more
regulation.35 But these ideas hardly eliminated either markets or
the common law.36 The common law became less concerned with
compensation for past harm done and more focused on risk
management for the future, but most of it retained its character
as judge-made law.37 While Grant Gilmore proclaimed the “death
of contract” in 1974, contract law hardly died.38 Rather, it evolved
into the great institutions of the First and Second Restatements
and the Uniform Commercial Code.39 Neoclassical criminal law
incorporated both theories of genetic inheritance and of marginal
deterrence, but it never abandoned its concerns with morality or
even retribution.40 Corporate law largely remained intact, even as
it abandoned backward-looking theories of corporate finance
expressed in the concept of par value shares and moved toward
rational expectations models.41 These views were clearly
35. See id. at 2.
36. See id. (“Except at the far left, legal thinkers of this period believed that
common law and capitalist legal institutions were worth preserving.”).
37. See id. at 123–58 (commenting on common law’s increasing orientation
toward expectations and risk management).
38. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974) (“We are told
that Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is.”).
39. See id. at 67–69 (discussing the development of the Restatements and
the Uniform Commercial Code). See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS (1931) (explaining general principles of contract law);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1975–1981) (same); U.C.C.
(1942–1952) (providing a uniform model code for state laws regarding
commercial transactions); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A
COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (1950)
(analyzing the rules of contract law and commenting on the Restatement).
40. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 36–52 (discussing
progressive criminal theory, which was “a blend of biological determinism,
marginal deterrence theory, and classical moralism”).
41. See id. at 159–83.
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revisionist, but they were just as clearly not progressive.42
Rather, they embraced changes in legal theory and doctrine that
claimed much broader support than progressive legal thought
ever did.43
II. Neoclassical Economic Thought
“Marginalism” equates value with reasonable expectations
about the next choice.44 This was in sharp contrast to the classical
political economists, who tended to see value as a consequence of
previous decisions.45 Marginalism completely upended classical
political economy’s theory of value by changing the perspective
from backward to forward looking.46 For example, while
classicists shared a strong belief that competition drives prices
toward cost, the term “cost” usually meant an average of past
expenses.47 By contrast, marginalists were able to articulate a
much more precise relationship between prices and cost, first by
the concept of “marginal” cost, or the anticipated cost of making
one further unit in the future, and somewhat later, marginal
revenue.48 Value became associated with marginal willingness-topay or marginal willingness-to-accept.49 These tools enabled
42. See id. at 3–4.
43. See id. at 4.
44. See George J. Stigler, The Adoption of the Marginal Utility Theory, 4
HIST. POL. ECON. 571, 572–75 (1972) (providing the history of marginalism). For
a brief history, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–35 (describing the
development of marginalism). For a longer history focusing mainly on Britain
and the European continent, see RICHARD S. HOWEY, THE RISE OF THE MARGINAL
UTILITY SCHOOL: 1870–1889 (1989).
45. See, e.g., David Ricardo, Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value, in 4
WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 357, 361 (Piero Sraffa &
Maurice Dobb eds., 1951) (discussing Ricardo’s perspective on the measurement
of value). For a brief history of classical value theory, written by a qualified
defender, see Klaus Hagendorf, The Labor Theory of Value: A Marginal Analysis
(Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 1958566), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1958566.
46. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 29.
47. See id. at 27–28.
48. See id. at 28.
49. See id. at 29.
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marginalists to relate cost, value, and decision making with much
greater clarity than the classicists had achieved.50
Prior to the 1870s, Anglo-American political economy largely
developed its theory of value from the amount of labor that went
into something.51 In Adam Smith’s words, “The real price of
everything . . . is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.”52 The
relevant queries were backward looking, and typically located
“value” by dividing total past investment by the number of units
produced.53
In sharp contrast, contemporary English political philosophy
was increasingly utilitarian, particularly under the influence of
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Austin (1790–1859).54
Bentham developed sophisticated, forward-looking concepts of
marginal deterrence in criminal law55 as well as declining
marginal utility, or the idea that any good has less incremental
value per unit as one acquires more of it.56 He also had a
conception of “equilibrium,”—or the idea that things move from
50. See id. (“Marginalism greatly facilitated the development of distinctions
between investment (fixed) costs and operating (variable) costs, and of the
effects of decisions over time.”).
51. See MAURICE DOBB, THEORIES OF VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION SINCE ADAM
SMITH: IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 45 (1973) (discussing Adam Smith’s
theory of labor value).
52. ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. I, at ch. 5.2 (1776).
53. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–28.
54. See id. at 3 (noting Bentham and Austin’s influence on British legal
thinking).
55. See id. at 28–29 (explaining that despite developing “both the concepts
of declining marginal utility and marginal deterrence in criminal law,” Bentham
neglected to develop marginalist theories of cost or value).
56. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (c. 1793),
reprinted in 1 WERNER STARK, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS: CRITICAL
EDITION BASED ON HIS PRINTED WORKS AND UNPRINTED MANUSCRIPTS 113 (1952)
(“[T]he quantity of happiness produced by a particle of wealth (each particle
being of the same magnitude) will be less at every particle; the second will
produce less than the first, the third less than the second, and so on.”); see also
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, pt. 1, at ch. 6 (1802), reprinted
in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 304–07 (John Bowring ed., 1838)
(discussing the effect of wealth on happiness). For Bentham’s influence on
thinking about marginal deterrence, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION
OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 36–37, 103–20
(2011).
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lower to high utility and come to rest when utilities are
equalized.57
One enigma in nineteenth century British thought is the
extent to which classical political economy and utilitarianism in
political philosophy existed side by side, all the while
encompassing inconsistent theories about value.58 The mystery is
all the more perplexing because the French economist Augustin
Cournot (1801–1877) had embraced marginalism much earlier
and was known in England.59 His work was more mathematical,
however, than anything that the English political economists did
prior to the late nineteenth century.60
Before economics could become marginalist, Bentham’s ideas
about expected utility had to migrate from criminal law and
politics into a theory of market exchange. Late in his life, John
Stuart Mill began toying with marginalist ideas, although even
today the extent of Mill’s marginalism is disputed.61 The real task
of rewriting British political economy along marginalist lines fell
to William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), F.Y. Edgeworth (1845–
1926), and Alfred Marshall (1842–1924).62 By common belief,
John Bates Clark in the United States (1847–1938) arrived at
marginalism simultaneously, independently, and radically.63
57. See Werner Stark, Jeremy Bentham as an Economist, 56 ECON. J. 583,
583–84 (1946) (explaining Bentham’s concept of equilibrium).
58. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–28.
59. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 299–300 (4th ed.
1985) (discussing Cournot’s influence on marginalist thought).
60. See id. at 317–19.
61. See N.B. de Marchi, Mill and Cairnes and the Emergence of
Marginalism in England, in THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 78–97
(R.D. Collison Black et al. eds., 1973) (discussing John Stuart Mill’s treatment of
marginalist theory); John Stuart Mill, Notes on N.W. Senior’s Political Economy,
reprinted in 12 ECONOMICA 134 (1945) (similar).
62. See BLAUG, supra note 59, at 300.
63. See JOHN BATES CLARK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH: ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES NEWLY FORMULATED chs. 4–5 (1886) (analyzing production in
marginalist terms); JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY
OF WAGES, INTEREST, AND PROFITS vi–vii (1899) (discussing marginal value and
distribution); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 870 (1950)
(describing Clark as one of the “last of the claimants to independent discovery of
the principle of marginal analysis”); Thomas Nixon Carver, The Marginal
Theory of Distribution, 13 J. POL. ECON. 257, 260 (1905) (referencing Clark’s
work on wealth distribution).

664

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2015)

For the marginalists, all value lay in anticipations about the
future.64 “Value depends entirely on utility,” Jevons wrote in the
early 1870s, not on previous investment.65 Jevons then developed
simple models of exchange, in which people traded to increase
their personal utility.66 He showed that any individual would
maximize value by trading up to the point that he had exactly the
same marginal utility for everything.67 If there was an imbalance,
he would make further trades until utilities were equalized.68
From these principles, marginalists developed what eventually
became a powerful set of mathematical tools to describe how the
economy moves toward equilibrium.69 Alfred Marshall, who was
obsessed with fluid mechanics, developed this idea much
further.70 Justice Holmes, who was not an economist, later
recognized its importance.71
While the classical theory of value depended on purely
material components relating to costs, marginalist value theory
was behavioral, based on assumptions about how human beings
make choices.72 It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this
difference between classical and neoclassical value theory. While
classicists tended to see political economy as part of the law of
nature, neoclassicists increasingly saw economics as part of social

64. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27.
65. See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2,
59–60 (1871) (explaining degrees of utility from consumption).
66. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 28–29 (discussing Jevons’s
theories of exchange).
67. See id. (explaining Jevons’s concept of “equation of utilities”).
68. See id. at 29 (“When someone is satisfied with exactly what he has, ‘it
follows that . . . an increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility
in one use as in another.’”).
69. See id. at 30–31 (discussing the marginalist understanding of
equilibrium).
70. See id. at 31.
71. See id. (explaining Justice Holmes’s use of “equilibrium”); Stephen
Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization, and Coercion: Justice Holmes on the Tax
Power, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 115, 143 (Robert W.
Gordon ed., 1992) (quoting Holmes’s letter of July 19, 1911, to Frank Taussig
discussing Holmes’s perspective on wealth and equilibrium).
72. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 29–30.
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science.73 The same thing occurred in elite legal theory, which
moved from natural science to social science models as well.74
Marginalism spread very quickly and by the turn of the
century claimed many of America’s most prominent economists.
These included John Bates Clark (Columbia),75 Irving Fisher
(Yale),76 Francis Amasa Walker (Yale),77 Arthur Twining Hadley
(Yale),78 Simon Newcomb (Johns Hopkins)79 and Charles Sanders
Peirce (mainly U.S. Government, philosophy of science).80 It
quickly became a staple in American economic treatises and
texts.81
73. See id. at 16.
74. See id. at 7 (explaining that legal issues that had “been articulated in
terms of natural law and morality were recast as problems of evolutionary social
science and risk management”).
75. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing John Bates
Clark’s opinions and scholarship on marginalism).
76. See, e.g., Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of
Value and Prices, in 9 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT ACADEMY 27, 38
(1892) (diagraming marginal utility).
77. See FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, THE WAGES QUESTION: A TREATISE ON
WAGES AND THE WAGES CLASS 138–48 (1876) (rejecting the wage fund doctrine);
FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 99–105 (1883) (illustrating
principles of final utility in market exchange).
78. See ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 78–79 (1898)
(explaining marginal utility theory).
79. See, e.g., D.W. Goodwin, Marginalism Moves to the New World, 4 HIST.
POL. ECON. 551, 558–59 (1972) (discussing Simon Newcomb’s career and his
development as a marginalist); Simon Newcomb, On the Method and Province of
Political Economy, 121 N. AM. REV. 241 (1875) (analyzing principles of political
economy pertaining to domestic industry); Simon Newcomb, The Theory of
Political Economy, 114 N. AM. REV. 435 (1872) (reviewing WILLIAM STANLEY
JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871) and analyzing Jevons’s work
on marginal utility).
80. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 138–39 (discussing Peirce’s
contributions to marginalist economics).
81. See, e.g., CHARLES J. BULLOCK, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ECONOMICS 91–97 (1897) (distinguishing between total and marginal utility);
HERBERT J. DAVENPORT, OUTLINES OF ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS 62–66 (1897)
(explaining the doctrine of “margins,” utility, and value); EDWARD T. DEVINE,
ECONOMICS 189 (1898) (explaining marginal utility’s relationship with a
community’s valuation of goods); RICHARD T. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS 121–
25 (1893) (exploring marginalist concepts of value and utility); FRANK A. FETTER,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS WITH APPLICATIONS TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 23–27
(1904) (defining marginal utility and its relationship to value); IRVING FISHER,

666

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2015)

At the same time, there were notable outliers on both the left
and the right. Thorstein Veblen, the grandparent of left-leaning
American institutionalism, opposed marginalism because in his
mind its stripped-down theory of rational decision making was
not sufficiently evolutionary and did not give an adequate
account of human behavior.82 On the far right was Yale’s William
Graham Sumner, a Social Darwinist and defender of classicism
who wrote more as a public intellectual than an economist.83
By the turn of the century, marginalist ideas were attaining
widespread acceptance in American universities, both inside and
outside of formal economics.84 Marginalism was also ideologically
diverse, capturing both left-leaning as well as more conservative
economists. On the left was institutionalist labor economist John
R. Commons, who was an important American developer of
marginalist theory before he identified himself with
institutionalism and labor economics.85 The same was true of tax
ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 286–95 (1911) (analyzing demand and its
relationship to marginal desirability); HADLEY, supra note 78 and accompanying
text (discussing marginal utility theory); HENRY R. SEAGER, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMICS 89–92 (1904) (explaining valuation of goods and marginal utility
both as a social process and in an industrial society); EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CONDITIONS
192 (1905) (explaining that the utility, or value, of a commodity is equivalent to
the cost of the labor); FRANK W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 120–37
(1911) (applying and analyzing marginal utility).
82. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 34 (noting Veblen’s
criticisms of marginalist theories); Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an
Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373, 384 (1898) (criticizing the lack of
evolutionary understanding in marginalism); Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations
of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 620–21 (1909) (criticizing marginal
utility theory’s failure to include a theory of growth and change).
83. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 25–27 (discussing Sumner’s
perspective on social evolution); WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, COLLECTED ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 16–17 (1885) (arguing against monopolies in
favor of competition for supply and demand to achieve equilibrium).
84. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 33 (“After 1900, both
economic and legal thought were increasingly dominated by a mixture of
Darwinian and marginalist principles, with marginalism taking an increasing
role.”). On the use of marginalist analysis by non-economists, see DOROTHY
ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 389 (1991).
85. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (London,
Macmillan & Co., 1893) (developing theories of distribution and discussing
marginal utility as it applies to the theories).
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economist Edwin R.A. Seligman, who incorporated marginalist
economics into his studies about the shifting and incidence of
taxation as well as his advocacy of a graduated income tax.86
More conservative and laissez-faire economists who adopted
marginalist analysis included John Bates Clark (Columbia),87 J.
Laurence Laughlin (University of Chicago),88 Arthur Twining
Hadley, who became a long-serving president of Yale
University,89 and later Harvard’s Frank Taussig, who was more
moderate.90 Indeed, early criticism of American antitrust policy, a
progressive innovation, came from marginalist economists such
as Hadley, who believed that antitrust would interfere with firms’
ability to reach efficient size through merger or collaboration.91
86. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 98–102 (discussing
Seligman’s work on progressive taxes and shifting tax burdens); EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 165–76 (rev. ed. 1899)
(discussing the “mathematical theory” of the incidence of taxation including the
work of marginalists); Edwin R.A. Seligman, On the Shifting and Incidence of
Taxation, 7 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 7, 119–20 (1892) (discussing the relationship
between taxation and the law of value); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive
Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 1, 132–33 (1894)
(discussing theories of value in advocating for a progressive income tax); Edwin
R.A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 52,
53 (1893) (“[T]he marginal utility theory of value was held to furnish an
irrefragable proof of the necessity of progression.”). For an extended history of
Progressive Era tax policy, including Seligman’s role, see AJAY K. MEHROTRA,
MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929 (2013).
87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing John Bates
Clark’s views on marginalism).
88. See ROSS, supra note 84, at 175–76 (discussing the gradual transition of
classical economists to marginalist thought).
89. See HADLEY, supra note 78 and accompanying text (referencing
marginal utility theory). See generally Arthur T. Hadley, Economic Laws and
Methods, 8 SCI. 46 (1886) (analyzing and explaining the relationship between
economics and jurisprudence).
90. See FRANK TAUSSIG, 2 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 153–63 (1913)
(discussing the relationship between wages and value as well as how marginal
utility governs value).
91. See THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES
72 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2012) (discussing Hadley’s
position that monopoly or collusion were essential for certain industries to avoid
bankruptcy); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 125–27 (1989) (explaining
Hadley’s theory that “competition would force capital-intensive industries to
charge ruinous prices” that would ultimately end in bankruptcy).
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The prominent Johns Hopkins public intellectual Simon
Newcomb, who wrote in many areas of science and mathematics
as well as economics, was both a marginalist and a staunch
defender of laissez-faire economics.92 Newcomb’s fierce debates in
the 1880s with progressive economist Richard T. Ely drew the
battle lines over the future of the discipline. The debate focused
on whether marginalism was consistent with laissez-faire
political theory.93
During the decades following Reconstruction, both
Darwinian and marginalist ideas went from controversial to
mainstream, with dissenters increasingly shunted to the
sidelines.94 These ideas eventually captured virtually all the
American academy in their respective fields. By the 1920s, pretty
much everyone with a thoughtful opinion had embraced both
biological evolution and marginalist economics.95
In that case, just how much of the contemporaneous
revolution in legal thought was really progressive, and how much
reflected a much broader revolution that accommodated these
disruptive ideas in different ways? By and large, those who
lament the progressive revolution in legal thought today would
not turn the clock back on marginalist economics and, for the
most part, not on Darwinian evolution either. But
accommodating the theory of evolution and marginalist analysis
required so much revision of classical legal thought that it could
no longer be called “classical.” Further, legal progressivism by

92.
93.

See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 86.
See Richard T. Ely, The Past and the Present of Political Economy, in 2
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 143,
151–52 (1884) (opposing laissez-faire); Simon Newcomb, The Two Schools of
Political Economy, 14 PRINCETON REV. 291, 291–92 (1884) (criticizing Ely). The
debate was originally published in Science magazine and later collected as
Science Economic Discussion (1886). See ALBERT E. MOYER, A SCIENTIST’S VOICE
IN AMERICAN CULTURE: SIMON NEWCOMB AND THE RHETORIC OF SCIENTIFIC
METHOD 108–26 (1992) (providing a detailed discussion of debates between
Newcomb and Ely and their respective positions).
94. See HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM, supra note 30, at 4–7 (discussing
Darwinism’s effect and reception in the United States).
95. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing the
institutional and political support for both Darwinism and marginalism).
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and large did not carry these ideas any further, although it did
spin them in different directions.
Darwinism and marginalism both had profound and
simultaneous influences on American legal thought.96 Ironically,
however, they were built on fiercely inconsistent assumptions
about human nature.97 Their preferred methodologies of social
control were very different as well.98 They managed to occupy
common intellectual turf principally among the early
progressives, as well as legal scholars, who used ideas more
promiscuously than most scientists and social scientists did.99
Darwinians believed that human beings, like all organisms
including plants, had an instinct for survival that dominated
everything else, even conscious choice.100 Further, this instinct
was forever and relentlessly reactionary against the environment,
making the concept of free choice almost meaningless.101 For the
Darwinian social scientist, the human being was a body, and the
mind merely one of its many organs seeking survival.102 Speaking
of Darwinian instrumentalist John B. Watson, Justice Holmes
wrote Harold Laski in 1928 that Watson was “so preoccupied
with resolving all our conduct into reflex reactions to stimuli, that
he almost denies that consciousness means anything and that
memory is more than a useless and misleading word.”103
96. See id. at 3.
97. See id. at 15–16 (explaining that Darwinians believed that choices were
based on survival instincts, whereas marginalists believed that decision making
was an autonomous event).
98. See id. at 16–17 (noting that marginalists believed social control was
incentive based, while Darwinists believed that the individual was fixed at
birth).
99. See id. at 33–34.
100. See HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM, supra note 30, at 6 (“The most
popular catchwords of Darwinism ‘struggle for existence’ and ‘survival of the
fittest,’ when applied to the life of man in society, suggested that nature would
provide that the best competitors in a competitive situation would win.”).
101. See id. at 164 (discussing Darwinian beliefs that “‘social hindrances’
cannot prevent men of high ability from becoming eminent, and . . . ‘social
advantages are incompetent to give that status to a man of moderate ability’”).
102. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 15.
103. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Nov. 23, 1928),
in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI: 1916–1935, at 1113 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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In sharp contrast, marginalism was built on a rationalexpectations model that saw the human being entirely as a mind,
whose choices might or might not benefit the body.104 The
marginalist mind, in sharp distinction from that of the
Darwinian, was rational and autonomous, developing and
asserting preferences to maximize its position within its
environment.105 Further, as marginalist economics became more
rigorous in the 1930s, it virtually ruled out all inquiry into the
biological or other external sources of preference.106 Such
investigations were not within the boundaries of economic
science.107
Followed to their logical conclusions, these inconsistent views
about human nature led to completely incompatible philosophies
of social control. For the Darwinian, any particular individual’s
deviant harmful conduct could not be controlled except by
incarceration.108 The only way to address the problem over the
longer run was through sterilization or sexual isolation—a
proposition that many American progressives embraced.109 By
contrast, the marginalist believed that persons would respond
rationally to rewards and penalties.110 As a result, punishment
could be metered to the offense. In The Path of the Law, as
observed below, Holmes categorically aligned himself with the
marginalists.111
104. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 15 (“By contrast,
marginalism saw the human being as a highly rational mind, controlling a body
that would prosper or not from the mind’s choices.”).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 16 (“Marginalist economists increasingly came to think that
human preferences are autonomous, or at least that science could not uncover
their origins.”).
107. See id. (“[T]he enterprise of searching for a common biological or social
structure that linked the preferences of different individuals was ostracized
from economic science.”).
108. See id. at 36 (noting that many Darwinists believed that criminal
behavior was an inherited quality and that individuals were not responsible for
their behavior).
109. See id. at 42–47 (discussing theories of criminality and compulsory
sterilizations).
110. See id. (“[M]arginalism saw criminal and other antisocial conduct
mainly as a problem in metering sanctions.”).
111. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
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III. Neoclassical Legal Policy
Marginalism’s forward-looking theory of value was a
revolution in human perspective about choice and decision
making. It also posed formidable administrative difficulties.
Either Yogi Berra or physics Nobel laureate Niels Bohr once
observed that “prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about
the future.”112 No matter the author, the point is important. The
forward looking view of the world opened up by marginalist
thought involved much more uncertainty than anything that
economic classicists had considered. To be useful for policy and
prediction, both economics and legal theory developed an idea of
rational expectations, or the reasonable foresight of an average
person, to manage decision making about value.113 His ability to
capture this insight made Holmes America’s greatest marginalist
in turn-of-the-century legal policy.114
One important result, strongly influenced by Holmes, was a
revolution in the common law of contracts, property, and tort:
changing their focus from compensation for past harm done
toward management of risks and ongoing relationships.115 The
law of commercial contracts abandoned its strict requirements of
previously agreed upon price, quantity, product, and terms of
delivery.116 Instead, neoclassical contract law evolved toward
increasing acceptance of open-ended arrangements that looked to
the furtherance of future relationships, requiring business firms
457, 458, 461, 471, 473–74 (1897) (espousing marginalist theories such as
forward-looking views of legal duties and value, the circumstances of crimes,
and the perspective that a criminal’s character is not dispositive); infra notes
167–185 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed discussion of Holmes
as a marginalist).
112. ARTHUR K. ELLIS, TEACHING AND LEARNING ELEMENTARY SOCIAL STUDIES
431 (3d ed. 1986); see also Ronald J. Allen, Complexity, the Generation of Legal
Knowledge, and the Future of Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1384, 1386 n.1 (2013)
(noting that authorship of the statement is in doubt).
113. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 151.
114. See infra notes 257–268 and accompanying text.
115. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 122.
116. See id. at 126 (stating that changes in contract law “undermined the
traditional rule that a contract was not ‘complete’ unless it contained a specified
price, a specified quantity and a specified good or service”).
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to behave within rationally expected parameters but not
necessarily specifying price, quantity, or other specific terms.117
These developments were aided by the creation of neoclassical
profit-maximization models that made it possible to predict
objectively rational business decisions, although not necessarily
noncommercial behavior.118 Aided by the rise of actuarial science,
tort law adopted probabilistic theories of causation, shared
liability, and risk management.119 Included was a growing
appreciation of strict liability as a device for forcing
manufacturers to internalize the social cost of defective
products.120
Marginalism’s reorientation of decision theory toward future
expectations was much more realistic about the way people
behave.121 At the same time, however, incorporating these
forward-looking conceptions of human behavior destabilized legal
policy.122 The range of predicted values is much larger than the
range of averaged values taken from the past. Marx aside,
classical political economy never developed pronounced
interventionist views in distinction from accepted laissez-faire
alternatives.123 Marginalism, by contrast, broke down quickly into
left- and right-leaning views, both of which were generally
consistent with the marginalist assumptions of the day.124

117. See id. (noting increased enforcement of “output” or “requirement”
contracts for unspecified quantities).
118. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 123–29 (discussing the
growing divide between commercial and noncommercial contracts).
119. See id. at 144–45 (describing changes in the tort system, including the
development of risk analysis, actuarial science, and industrial developments
that made negligence more common, and causation more complex).
120. See id. at 148–50 (discussing the development of strict liability theory
through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its application to the Coca-Cola
bottle cases).
121. See id. at 129.
122. See id. at 129–50.
123. See id. at 6 (“Classical economic thought was unified by a historical
theory of value and a deep hostility toward State interference in private
arrangements.”).
124. See id. at 7 (explaining that marginalism has “gyrated among political
ideologies” and “breaks apart into radically different views”).
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A. Market Diversity and Failure: Antitrust and Regulation
As marginalist economics became formalized, particularly in
the writings of F.Y. Edgeworth and Alfred Marshall, economists
and later lawyers increasingly came to believe two things. First,
markets differ from one another.125 Second, the conditions for
robust competition are met less often than the classical political
economists had assumed, making markets more prone to
failure.126 Marginalist economists of every political stripe
accepted these propositions, although they differed as to the
amount as well as about policy implications.127 Further, their
views changed over time.
Notwithstanding his near-socialism on questions of wealth
redistribution, the great Cambridge University economist Alfred
Marshall managed to produce the most important industrial
economics book of his era, and it was largely committed to
determining the conditions of competition, with monopoly as an
occasional exception.128 However, certain problems emerged in
Marshall’s formulation of competition theory.129 Under his model
of marginal-cost pricing, competitive firms with fixed costs would
end up cutting prices to the point that they could not recover
their capital investment.130 The result was “ruinous competition”
that would work itself out until only one firm remained in the
market.131 For this reason a significant group of economists
125. See id. at 35.
126. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated,
65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957).
127. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 82 (describing the range of
beliefs among marginalists over market failure and other economic theories).
128. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 5–6 (1890).
129. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 206 (explaining that
“marginalist analysis and even Marshall’s own work threw the economic study
of industry into division and disarray” because of its issues with competition).
130. See id. (“[C]ompetition forces prices towards immediate costs without
leaving enough to cover capital costs. . . . [T]his ‘ruinous competition’ problem
was generalized to all industries with significant fixed costs.”).
131. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of
Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 533 (2011) (“[C]ompetition was thought to
become ‘ruinous’ as each firm cut its price to marginal cost without having
enough left over to pay off fixed costs. Firms would either go out of business
until only a single monopoly firm remained or else they would be forced to
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opposed the newly enacted Sherman Act,132 while progressives
tended to favor it.133 The mainstream marginalist view was
mainly premised on the idea that fixed costs and economies of
scale dictated large firm size and that any attempt to intervene
would be counterproductive.134 For example, the “ruinous
competition” antitrust defense was presented to the courts as a
justification for railroad price fixing.135
Marshall himself was never able to solve the problem of fixed
costs satisfactorily.136 The problem was perceived most strongly
in the railroads, the large industry with the highest proportion of

collude.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis,
1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 320–22 (2009) (explaining the marginalist
disfavor of antitrust policy).
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (enacted 1890); see also Henry Rand Hatfield, The
Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1, 6 (1899) (noting that the majority
of the economists present at the conference favored consolidation of large
businesses). The proceedings of this meeting were published as Chicago
Conference on Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Resolutions (1900). See MAKING OF
COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 91, at 72 (noting the difference in marginalist
and progressive perspectives of the Sherman Act).
133. See, e.g., RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 240–41 (1912)
(noting methods used to counteract monopolies); CHARLES R. VAN HISE,
CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL 174–92 (1912) (discussing the Sherman Act and
its effectiveness); TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS (William Z. Ripley ed., rev.
ed. 1916) (noting the need for the Sherman Act to address “unfair practices” in
business).
134. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 206 (explaining that the
concern over ruinous competition led many economists to believe that the only
solution was “monopoly or collusion” and that the government could not resolve
the problem).
135. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898)
(“[T]he only resort open to railroads to save themselves from the effects of a
ruinous competition is that of agreements among themselves to check and
control it. A ruinous competition is, as they say, apt to be carried on until the
weakest of the combatants goes to destruction.”); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (noting that defendants argued
that “each member would be subjected to ruinous competition by the other”
without an internal agreement); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at
312–13 (noting that the “ruinous competition” defense had been accepted by
courts in price-fixing cases); Ann Mayhew, How American Economists Came to
Love the Sherman Antitrust Act, 30 HIST. POL. ECON. 179, 191–92 (Supp. 1998)
(discussing economists’ defense of trusts to prevent “cut-throat competition” and
“ruinous losses”).
136. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 207–09.
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fixed costs.137 Within that environment, price regulation emerged
as a defensible, if imperfect, solution.138 Eventually economists
began to develop more complex models of competitive behavior
taking price discrimination139 and product differentiation into
account.140 These largely brought the fixed controversy to an end.
Historians writing about regulation have tended to
emphasize political over economic and technical issues.141
Initially most of them saw regulation as the outcome of a war
between capitalist defenders of laissez-faire economics and new
progressive ideas.142 Later, the dominant view came to be that
137. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at 311.
138. See, e.g., ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, RAILWAY REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS IN RAILWAY ECONOMICS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 19 (1918)
Railway rivalry tends to be abnormally keen and competition ruinous.
This in turn, leads to co-operation in various forms. . . . Competing
railway companies . . . either consent to a truce whereby competition
between them is abolished and arrive at an agreement for the
maintenance of rates, or continue their warfare until one of the roads
is driven to insolvency.
Sharfman was a professor of political economy at the University of Michigan.
See also WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION 259, 293 (1912)
(describing how railroads acting in competition might either set rates or
establish agreements to avoid waste in transportation). Ripley was a Harvard
University professor of economics. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22,
at 311–12 (explaining Hadley’s theory of ruinous competition and noting that
the combination appeared to be the only solution).
139. See generally JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
OVERHEAD COSTS 35–69 (1923) (discussing differential costs and price
discrimination).
140. See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
71–73 (1933) (explaining product differentiation under monopolistic
competition); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 4–5
(1933) (discussing product differentiation and monopoly).
141. See Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1018 (noting
that historical studies of regulation focus more on politics and less on regulatory
theories developed by economists of that time).
142. See, e.g., HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE: 1897–
1917, at 368–79 (1977) (discussing the impact of progressive ideologies on
government regulation); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 228–29
(1955) (discussing the conflict over regulation between large corporate
businesses and progressive ideals); EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 613 (1932) (discussing the growing opposition to “big
business”).
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most regulation was actually passed at the behest of regulated
firms who wanted to relieve themselves from the rigors of
competition.143
In retrospect, it seems clear that the railroad industry was
threatened with both ruinous competition and monopoly,
depending on the circumstances.144 Among historians, both sides
of the regulation story give short shrift to the significant amount
of technical economic work that sought to define when regulatory
intervention was appropriate and what were its proper
boundaries.145 That debate was heavily driven by differing
conceptions about the nature and ubiquity of market failure.146
Writing in the first half of the twentieth century, progressive
historians painted a picture of the nineteenth century as a
laissez-faire state until progressive government regulation
developed as a response to late nineteenth century abuses as well
as the labor movement.147 The critique created a seriously
exaggerated image of hostility toward government regulation.148
At the same time, the domain of nineteenth century
regulation was significantly narrower than it became after the
Progressive Era.149 Earlier regulation fell mainly within the
143. See KOLKO, infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the
capture theory of regulation).
144. See Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1044
If the railroads were permitted to have unregulated monopolies, rate
gouging and large monopoly profits at the expense of carriers were
sure to result. . . . [I]f the railroads were forced to compete with each
other . . . railroad rates would almost certainly be driven to a level too
low to cover fixed costs, eventually forcing railroads into bankruptcy.
145. See id. at 1021.
146. See id. at 1017.
147. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 159 (arguing that
Progressive-Era historians tended to favor the narrative which presented the
development of business policy as part of a “survival of the fittest,” in which the
government favored big business and disfavored the labor movement).
148. See id. at 278 (“The United States had a strong tradition of regulation
at every governmental level that stretched back to the commonwealth ideal of
Revolutionary times and maintained a growing presence throughout the
nineteenth century.”); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW &
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA ix (1996) (arguing that the
idealized laissez-faire state never existed and that nineteenth century America
was actually a well-regulated state).
149. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243 (describing the
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triumvirate of “health, safety, or morals” that was clearly
recognized in Gilded Age case law as well as the contemporary
constitutional treatise writers.150 Under this view, which came to
define the boundaries of substantive due process constitutional
analysis, the state had authority to intervene to protect the
morals of everyone from their own degenerate inclinations.151 By
contrast, health or safety concerns justified regulation when the
feared injury was on third parties who were not in a position to
bargain over an issue.152 For example, in Lochner, Justice
Peckham condemned the bakers’ ten-hour provision because he
could not find a relationship between the ten-hour rule and the
“healthful quality of the bread” that the bakers produced.153 As
adult individuals with contractual capacity, the bakers could
bargain about their own personal health and well-being, but
bread consumers were not participants in that bargain.154 Three
years later, attorney Louis Dembitz Brandeis was able to turn the
Court on this issue by writing a “social science” brief whose
argument was divided into three parts, dealing with the effect of
long working hours on women’s “health, safety, and morals.”155

substantive due process era and the Court’s reluctance to interfere with contract
or property rights).
150. See id. at ch. 13 (listing “health, safety, and morals” triumvirate as
qualifications on economic substantive due process).
151. See id. at 256.
152. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (explaining that
statutes limiting work hours are not within a state’s police power unless
reasonable grounds exist to indicate “some material danger to the public health
or to the health of the employees”).
153. See id. at 62 (explaining that any connection between work hours and
bread quality is “too shadowy and thin to build any argument for the
interference of the legislature”).
154. See id. (“There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades . . . or that they are not able to
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
State”); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 250 (noting that Justice
Peckham rejected the notion that regulation was needed to protect consumer
interests, and found that the bakers were capable of making contracts).
155. See Brief for Defendant in Error at 28–46, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (No. 107) (focusing on the harm to women’s health, safety and
morals); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 249–51 (discussing the
importance and influence of this aspect of Brandeis Brief).

678

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2015)

The health, safety, and morals triumvirate dominated
constitutional discussion about the limits of economic regulation
during the Gilded Age.156 The phrase was used in forty-four
published judicial opinions prior to 1890, an additional 100 cases
between 1890 and 1900, and in another 1,100 cases between 1900
and 1930. After the United States v. Carolene Products Co.157
decision announced the end of close federal judicial scrutiny of
economic regulation, the health, safety, and morals triumvirate
became relatively unimportant.158 It gave way to more secular
theories of market failure that justified regulation on economic
grounds.159
While the economic theory of regulation since Carolene
Products has divided into differing opinions about its social value
and harm, the dominant ones are all marginalist and all center
on two questions. The first concerns the pervasiveness of market
failure. The second concerns the ability of the political system to
recognize market failure and do something constructive about
it.160 Any divide between conservatives and progressives showed
up mainly in issues of degree. Further, to the extent that the
political case against regulation is libertarian,161 those views are
not classical either. The classical theory opposing regulation in
the United States included a strongly moral and thus antilibertarian set of exceptions—even permitting such things as the
uncompensated shutdown of distilleries that had been legal when
they were built, Sunday work, or commercial transactions.162
156. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 251.
157. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
158. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 262.
159. See id. (explaining that regulation based on purely economic
considerations was an “important consequence of the marginalist revolution”).
160. See id. (describing the differing approaches to market failure).
161. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 55–56 (1962)
(arguing that regulations such as zoning are unnecessary because it is in private
parties’ greater interest to reach private contractual arrangements); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR
LIMITED GOVERNMENT ix (2014) (arguing that “classical liberal theory”
encompasses libertarian ideals such as “private property” and “limited
government”).
162. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 255–62 (describing
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The progressive critique of regulation argued that regulation
was in the public interest and intended to bring monopoly under
control.163 The rejection of that position came from both political
sides. New Left historian Gabriel Kolko argued that, far from
reflecting progressive concerns to control monopoly, railroad
regulation was actually instigated by the railroads themselves as
protection from excessive competition and bankruptcy.164
This regulatory capture thesis also became a staple of more
right-leaning libertarians and the Chicago School, all driven by
marginalist conceptions.165 For example, Buchanan and Tullock’s
Calculus of Consent conducted an extensive marginalist analysis
of individual rational decision making and its relationship to
social choice.166 Mancur Olson, whose influential book The Logic
regulations based on “moral” campaigns, including lotteries, alcohol, and
“Sunday laws,” which prohibited work or contract enforcement on Sundays).
163. See, e.g., 2 CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION 166–210 (1928) (discussing the rise of “economic barons” and
legislative attempts to control monopolies); EMORY RICHARD JOHNSON &
THURMAN WILLIAM VAN METRE, PRINCIPLES OF RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 499–
508 (1926) (discussing the need for railroad regulation and the effect of that
regulation); WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION, supra note
138, at 467–73 (discussing the effect of legal cases that limited rate-making
power and the harm caused by those limitations); 1 ISAIAH LEO SHARFMAN, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE 17–19 (1931) (discussing the background of the demand for federal
regulation to control railroad monopolies); Martin Knapp, The Regulation of
Railway Rates, 6 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 20, 20 (1905) (advocating for regulation
of railroads by “public authority”); Hugo R. Meyer, Government Regulation of
Railway Rates, 7 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 61, 61–62 (1906) (discussing federal
railroad regulation); William Z. Ripley, Public Regulation of Railroad Issues, 4
AM. ECON. REV. 541, 541 (1914) (arguing for railroad regulations to benefit the
public interest). The most influential defense of regulation in the public interest
was JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
164. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916, at 3
(1965); Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1020 (explaining that
federal regulation of railroads was supported by the railroads).
165. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. MGM’T SCI. 335, 335–36 (1974) (explaining regulatory capture theory);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4
(1971) (understanding that regulation is a “problem of discovering when and
why an industry . . . is able to use the state for its purposes”).
166. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 161, at vi (explaining that the
goal of the book is to “analyze the calculus of the rational individual” in regard
to decisions about constitutional issues).
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of Collective Action became among the most popular defenses of
the regulatory capture theory,167 developed it entirely out of the
neoclassical theory of how cartels discipline themselves.168 He
borrowed heavily from his thesis advisor Edward Chamberlin,
whose Theory of Monopolistic Competition had been published
thirty years earlier.169
The regulatory capture argument picked up one important
theme from substantive due process analysis. In Lochner, Justice
Peckham had professed suspicion that legislation such as the tenhour law was in fact passed for “other motives” than the
justifications offered for it.170 He did not identify the interest
groups behind the law, however, although they were already well
known at the time.171 Peckham suggested that a proffered motive
was to assure the “healthful quality of the bread,” but then added
that in the Court’s judgment it was “not possible in fact” to
discover that connection.172
Justice Peckham’s empirical conclusion is odd; not only had
no one shown a relationship between workers’ hours and the

167. See TUCK, infra note 169, at 3 (stating the importance of The Logic of
Collective Action).
168. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 6–7 (1965) (challenging traditional view that
organizations further members’ interests).
169. See id. at 9–24 (relying on EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933)); RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 3 (2008)
(noting Chamberlin’s influence on Olson’s work). Chamberlin had been Olson’s
thesis advisor but died before it was finished. See J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., The
Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson’s View of the Rise and Decline of Nations, 74
SO. ECON. J. 4, 4 n.2 (2007) (noting that Thomas C. Schelling finished
supervising Olson’s thesis after Chamberlin died in 1962).
170. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It is impossible for us
to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed
under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the
public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”).
171. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 26–28 (2011) (discussing the
role that the bakers’ union and other groups played in passing and enforcing the
Bakeshop Act); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 247–48, 271–73
(discussing the impact and influence of labor unions and women’s public action
groups, especially in the Bakeshop Act).
172. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63.
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quality of the product, but it was impossible to do so.173 Whether
or not that was true in 1905, the fact is that economic substantive
due process analysis was never good at identifying special
interest capture because it never developed any empirical or
other litigation tools for doing so.174 The case law either assumed
capture or else was indifferent to the question, concluding that
liberty of contract outweighed any market failure effects, whether
present or not.175 One defeated this premise not by showing an
absence of capture, but rather by showing that the regulation in
question pertained to health, safety, or morals.176
But Carolene Products, which completely rejected Lochner’s
approach to economic regulation, did not do any better. Its highly
deferential standard made legislative capture irrelevant to
constitutional analysis unless the regulation in question invaded
some explicit constitutional right or was so biased that it violated
even rational basis Equal Protection analysis.177 Carolene
Products itself illustrates the problem. The federal regulation at
issue prohibited “filled milk,” which consisted of milk to which a
small amount of oil had been added that enabled it to whip.178 It
was cheaper than dairy cream, healthier by today’s standards,
and performed better.179 Carolene produced it under the name
173. See id. at 62 (“In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the
connection between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and
the healthful quality of the bread made by the workman.”).
174. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 305 (“In retrospect, neither
Lochner-style economic due process nor Carolene Products’ extreme deference
was a good vehicle for ferreting out the harmful effects of special interest control
of legislation.”).
175. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63–64 (noting several state supreme courts
that upheld the right of freedom to contract over legislative attempts to regulate
various professions through licensing or certification).
176. See id. at 53 (explaining that legislative interference with the freedom
to contract is constitutional, provided that the law is a legitimate exercise of
police power because it relates to “safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the public”).
177. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(explaining that the presumption of constitutionality may be challenged when
legislation appears “on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution”).
178. See id. at 145 (describing the Filled Milk Act).
179. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP.
CT. REV. 397, 402.
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“Milnut.”180 It is produced to this day by Smucker’s, Inc., but
renamed “Milnot” a year after the decision.181 Far from being
progressive regulation in the public interest, Carolene Products
actually represented an instance of special interest capture by the
dairy industry, attempting to protect itself from an inexpensive
alternative.182 Just prior to the Supreme Court decision, several
state courts had struck down similar state law provisions because
they had not been shown to relate reasonably to health, safety, or
morals.183
B. The Neoclassical Market: The Commerce Clause and Interstate
Production
Gilded Age and early twentieth century markets were larger
than they had been previously, and in two different senses. The
first was technological, resulting from the revolution in
transportation and manufacturing.184 The railroad greatly
decreased the cost and increased the speed of interstate
shipments, and mass production required firms to seek out wider
markets for their goods.185

180. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146.
181. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 306 (explaining that
“Milnot” is for sale today and owned by Smucker’s); Miller, supra note 179, at
399 (similar).
182. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 305–06 (explaining that
Carolene Products “undermined the Supreme Court’s ability to limit ‘capture’ by
special interest groups”); Miller, supra note 179, at 398–99 (explaining that the
statute at issue was an extreme example of special interest legislation).
183. See, e.g., Carolene Prods. Co. v. McLaughlin, 5 N.E.2d 447, 449–50 (Ill.
1936) (concluding that the act in question was not enacted based on concern for
the public health); Carolene Prods. Co. v. Thomson, 267 N.W. 608, 611 (Mich.
1935) (concluding that prohibiting manufacture of filled milk, which is
“harmless to public health,” cannot be justified under the police power);
Carolene Prods. Co. v. Banning, 268 N.W. 313, 315 (Neb. 1936) (concluding that
a state statute banning filled milk is unrelated to “health, safety, morals or
general welfare”).
184. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that the
technological revolution in the late 1800s was due to “railroad expansion,
electricity, the internal combustion engine, and machine production”).
185. See id. at 295–96.
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Second was the changing economic conception of the market.
Historically the “market” had been viewed as a setting where
buyers and sellers make exchanges, a metaphor that was both
personal and local.186 For neoclassical economists such as Alfred
Marshall, however, the market was an area over which prices
moved toward equilibrium.187 The market became depicted by
demand and supply curves that did not distinguish individual
production activities.188 Acquisition of raw materials, processing,
distribution, and delivery all became part of an undifferentiated
production function.189 Further, a bottleneck at any stage could
affect all other stages. Recognition of this principle made the
manufacturing–commerce distinction untenable for situations
where a significant portion of a production-distribution chain was
interstate.190
Increasingly after the Civil War, important production
decisions were made in contemplation of interstate transactions,
mainly by rail.191 A New York producer of beet sugar might grow
and pack it for shipment to Boston or New York. A farmer’s
decision about what to plant and how much to grow depended
critically on his anticipation about the size of the market.192
These queries collapsed decisions about production and shipment
into one.193 They obliterated any usefulness that the distinction

186. See id. at 295 (stating that economists no longer viewed the market as
“a place where traders meet to exchange goods and haggle over prices”).
187. See id. (explaining Marshall viewed markets a “geographic area over
which prices tend to move toward an equilibrium”).
188. See Lawrence A. Boland, Difficulties with the Element of Time and the
‘Principles’ of Economics or Some Lies My Teachers Told Me, 8 E. ECON. J. 47, 52
(1982) (noting that one problem with Marshall’s definition is the assumption
that all quantities are fixed—except price).
189. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 295.
190. See id. at 296–97 (discussing the impact of wider manufacturing on the
manufacturing–commerce distinction).
191. See id. at 295.
192. See id.
193. See id. (“Neoclassical economics collapsed questions about how much to
grow, how much to manufacture, and how much to ship into a single one defined
by the anticipated size of the market.”).
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between “manufacturing” and “commerce” under dual federalism
might ever have had.194
In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 that manufacturing is
not commerce.195 As a result, the Sherman Act could not reach a
trust of sugar manufacturers located in a single state even if the
shipments were designated at production for interstate
shipment.196 The acknowledged object of the trust, as Justice
Harlan observed in his dissent, was “to obtain a [great] influence
or more perfect control over the business of refining and selling
sugar in this country.”197 To the extent the trust exported its
product, the state where the production plants were located was
the beneficiary rather than the victim of its monopoly.198 As a
result, Chief Justice Fuller and the majority stated the concern
backwards when they opined that the “relief of the citizens of
each state from the burden of monopoly and the evils resulting
from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the
states to deal with.”199 Insofar as this was a monopoly issue, the
state’s interest was aligned with the sellers’ rather than the
buyers’. The victims were elsewhere.
In 1918, the Supreme Court followed the sugar trust
reasoning in striking down the first federal child labor law.200

194. See id. at 295–96.
195. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.”).
196. See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–
1910, at 114 (1993) (explaining how the Court found that sugar refining was
manufacturing and that “monopolization of that economic activity . . . was a
proper subject of concern for the states, but not for the federal government”).
197. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also FISS, supra
note 196, at 114–15 (discussing Harlan’s opinion that the Sugar Trust had
created a monopoly to control the price of refined sugar in the United States);
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large
Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 648 (1978) (explaining the
significance of the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions for companies seeking to
manufacture on a large scale).
198. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17 (explaining that defendants’ actions
were limited to Pennsylvania and initial sales were made in Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania).
199. Id. at 11.
200. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918).
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Now the margin was 5–4, however.201 The statute prohibited the
use of child labor to produce goods that were shipped interstate
within thirty days of their manufacture.202 The thirty-day
limitation is telling because it indicates that interstate shipment
for the goods in question was planned.203 They were being
manufactured in fulfillment of orders from out of state.
Justice Holmes’s dissent made two eminently sensible points.
The first was that Congress was in fact regulating what could be
transported across a state line.204 It was not regulating child
labor for purely intrastate production and sale.205 His other point
was this:
The Act does not meddle with anything belonging to the
States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their
domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send
their products across the State line they are no longer within
their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress
their power to cross the line would depend upon their
neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not
to the States but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its
views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have
upon the activities of the States. Instead of being encountered
by a prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the State encounters
the public policy of the United States which it is for Congress
to express.206

The sugar trust and child labor decisions raised important
issues about market size and regulatory sovereigns. By the time
Hammer v. Dagenhart207 was decided, many states had enacted
child labor laws, and the Supreme Court had already held that a
201. See id. at 281.
202. See id. at 277 (“The single question in this case is whether Congress
has power to prohibit the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of any
product . . . in which within thirty days before the removal of the product
children . . . have been employed.”).
203. See id. at 268 (noting that the Act was “intended to prevent interstate
commerce in the products of child labor”).
204. See id. at 277.
205. See id. at 277–78 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The statute confines itself to
prohibiting the carriage of certain goods in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
206. Id. at 281.
207. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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state child labor provision did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.208 But while states limited the use of child labor within
their own borders, they did not limit the importation of goods
from other states that employed child labor.209 Thomas Reed
Powell and Edward Corwin independently complained that in a
market dominated by interstate shipment and individual state
child labor laws, there would be a race to the bottom to the extent
that manufacturers could employ child labor freely for interstate
shipments.210
Both United States v. E.C. Knight Co.211 and Hammer
illustrated what came to be a central proposition of neoclassical
theory: regulators who are smaller than the markets that they
are regulating produce self-dealing. States would benefit by
limiting monopolies for domestic consumption, but by
encouraging them for exported goods, which produced high
domestic returns and visited their harm elsewhere. The much
later decision in Parker v. Brown212 illustrated the problem. The
Supreme Court upheld a state-administered raisin allocation
program, a leftover of the first New Deal, which effectively
cartelized raisin production in California.213 Ninety-five percent
208. See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913)
(“It is . . . contended that the statute denied to the plaintiff in error the equal
protection of the laws; but the classification it established was clearly within the
legislative power.”).
209. See id. at 271–72 (“The act in its effect does not regulate transportation
among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be
employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.”).
210. See Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce a
Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 487 (1933)
(“If . . . programs of social reform . . . are rendered abortive in any state in
consequence of the flow of commerce into it from other states holding less
advanced views, then it becomes the duty . . . to supply the required relief.”);
Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L.
REV. 61, 67 (1922) (“Thus the beneficent operation of the commerce clause
includes a license to what humanitarians unkindly call the ‘backward states’ to
sacrifice the health and strength of future citizens and soldiers of the nation to
the domestication of gainful industry within their borders.”).
211. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
212. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
213. See id. at 350–68 (upholding the validity of the California Agricultural
Prorate Act); VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, THE FARMER’S BENEVOLENT TRUST: LAW
AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1865–1945, at 229–31
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of the raisins grown under the arrangement were shipped outside
of the state, making California an enormous beneficiary of the
cartel and the other states its victims.214 Neoclassical conceptions
of market failure and market size necessitated the conclusion
that efficient regulatory sovereigns must be large enough to
encompass the markets that they are regulating—a point that
Holmes realized full well in his Hammer dissent.215
The final Supreme Court decision relying on the
manufacturing–commerce distinction was Carter, which
overturned a federal statute that regulated working conditions
and production standards in the bituminous coal industry.216 A
few years later, the Supreme Court reversed course in United
States v. Darby,217 which overruled Hammer and upheld the Fair
Labor Standards Act, forbidding the interstate shipment of goods
in violation of its wage and hours provisions.218 Wickard v.
Filburn219 a year later created modern “affecting commerce”
jurisdiction.220
When it later applied Wickard to the Sherman Act, the
Supreme Court reflected a thoroughly neoclassical view of
markets, merging production and distribution into a single
function. The Court condemned an intrastate cartel among
stitching contractors for women’s clothing.221 The stitching cartel
(1998) (describing the effect of Parker on the California raisin industry).
214. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345 (“Between 90 and 95 percent of the raisins
grown in California are ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
215. See Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the ability of Congress to regulate commerce versus the
ability of the states).
216. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (“[T]he want of
power on the part of the federal government is the same whether the wages,
hours of service, and working conditions, and the bargaining about them, are
related to production before interstate commerce has begun, or to sale and
distribution after it has ended.”).
217. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
218. See id. at 115–16, 124 (“[T]he power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only
to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.”).
219. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
220. See id. at 124 (stating that the commerce power extends to activities
intrastate that substantially affect interstate commerce).
221. See United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 463
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was located in Boston, but its members purchased cloth from
outside the state and also sold locally to distributors who then
shipped more than eighty percent of their product into other
states.222 The Court brushed aside the defense that the price fix
was for stitching, all of which occurred within a single state:
The trial court appears to have dismissed the case chiefly on
the ground that the accused Association and its members were
not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. This may or
may not be the nature of their operation considered alone, but
it does not matter. Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be
applied all along the line of movement of interstate commerce.
The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of
a contract or combination usually is; the application of the
restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters
if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among
the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze.223

The Court was stating what came to be a bedrock principle of
the theory of vertical integration and price, embraced by every
ideology: a monopoly or cartel at any stage of a production chain
is able to capture the full monopoly profit available for that
product, even if prior and subsequent stages are competitive.224 A
cartel on purely intrastate stitching could have exactly the same
price effect on the final product as a cartel governing interstate
clothing production or, for that matter, even interstate railroad
transportation.

(1949) (“That such a contract restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act is
obvious . . . .”).
222. Id. at 461–62.
223. Id. at 464.
224. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75, 380–81
(1978) (discussing how tying arrangements can permit a monopolist to maximize
his gains); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6a (5th ed. 2015) (forthcoming); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197–99 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the effects of tying
arrangements); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Trying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 (1957) (similar).
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C. Holmes’s Marginalism: Deterrence and Risk Management
One noteworthy problem with the classical–progressive
dichotomy theory is the omnipresence of Holmes, whose career
stretched over a relatively brief Harvard faculty post, twenty
years as a state Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, and then thirty years on the United States
Supreme Court. On both federal and state law issues, he often
appeared to take the progressive side, leading some writers to
misinterpret his personal views quite seriously.225 For example,
he dissented from the Lochner decision striking down a ten-hour
law,226 the Hammer decision striking down a federal child labor
statute,227 and the Adkins v. Children’s Hospital228 decision
striking down a minimum wage statute for women workers.229
Nonetheless, while Holmes was clearly not classical, neither
was he progressive. He was conservative by nature and very
suspicious of economic tinkering by legislation.230 At the same
time, he shared many progressive views about race and
genetics.231 Holmes may or may not have been sincere in Lochner,
when he said he would need long study before determining his
position on the economic theory underlying labor protection
statutes.232 But just as certainly as Holmes was not a progressive,
he was an economic marginalist, and this made all the difference.
225. See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY 366–99 (1944) (emphasizing Holmes’s dissents); Walton
H. Hamilton, On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes, 9 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1941)
(“If the net result seemed to be liberalism, it was because his stay on the bench
coincided with an era of reform.”).
226. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
227. Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 277–81 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
228. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
229. Id. at 567–71 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
230. Irving Bernstein, The Conservative Mr. Justice Holmes, 23 NEW ENG. Q.
435, 435 (1950) (“Holmes, in fact, was as profound, as civilized, and as articulate
a conservative as the United States has produced.”)
231. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 38–42, 67 (discussing
Holmes’s views on Darwinism and the “science” of race).
232. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (discussing Holmes’s
Lochner dissent).
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Scholarship about Holmes has tended to emphasize the role
of Darwinian evolution in his thought, particularly its
evolutionary historicism.233 Holmes’s interest in evolution is
clear. For example, The Common Law cites the British Darwinian
anthropologist Edward Tylor several times for points about the
cultural evolution of legal norms.234
While these influences are undeniable, it is equally clear that
Holmes’s approach to legal policy was utilitarian and marginalist,
driven by concerns about deterrence and risk management.235 A
theme that dominates The Common Law is the appropriate legal
standards for managing risk and minimizing expected losses.
“[T]he safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person
who decides what precautions shall be taken,” stated his chapter on
trespass and negligence, giving several examples.236 The legal risk
must be borne by the one with superior control of the
circumstances, he wrote in his introductory chapter on torts,
speaking of the person who rides an unbroken horse on a crowded
way.237 He defended aggressive rules for highly dangerous conduct
that “throw the risk upon the party pursuing it.”238 He famously
argued that contracts involved “the taking of a risk” and a set of
233. See, e.g., 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
THE PROVING YEARS, 1870–1882, at 44–49 (1963) (arguing Holmes’s acceptance
of Darwin); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 49–69 (2001) (describing
Holmes’s scholarship as an evolution); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY:
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 230–31,
240 (2013) (describing the influence of evolutionary social thought on Holmes’s
views); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 41, 148–52 (1993) (discussing Holmes’s views on science, Darwinism,
and evolutionary historicism); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal
Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 126–40 (1984)
(describing the influence of Darwin and Spencer on Holmes’s views); Jan Vetter,
The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 363
(1984) (arguing that natural selection was the largest single influence on The
Common Law).
234. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 11, 19, 34 (1881) (citing
EDWARD TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE: RESEARCHES INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, ART, AND CUSTOM (1871)).
235. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 38–42 (discussing Holmes’s
marginalism).
236. HOLMES, supra note 234, at 117.
237. Id. at 157–58.
238. Id. at 149.
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bets about the future.239 Consequential damages were not
appropriate “unless the assumption of that risk is to be taken as
having fairly entered into the contract.”240
Holmes’s belief that we can never examine the internal
workings of the minds of others became a staple of legal thought in
the early twentieth century. His external standard began with the
hypothesis of the “average man,” considering “what would be
blameworthy in the . . . man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence.”241
Whether or not Holmes appreciated it, the substitution of the
hypothetical average person for inquiries about subjective state of
mind turned the law into a social control device for managing risk.
The average person did not really exist; he had to be reconstructed.
Harvard Law Professor and Holmes disciple Warren A. Seavey
wrote later of Holmes’s insights that “[t]he standard man evaluates
interests in accordance with the valuation placed upon them by the
community sentiment crystallized into law.”242
Holmes’s famous, widely reprinted commencement speech
entitled The Path of the Law (1897) was even clearer that the whole
point of law was marginal deterrence and that economics was
essential to its study.243 For example, the purpose of damages was
to give people a motive for good behavior. Holmes made this
powerful argument for marginal deterrence as the goal of criminal
punishment, categorically rejecting more Darwinian approaches:
If the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to
murder by as deep seated an organic necessity as that which
makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him
by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid
of; he cannot be improved, or frightened out of his structural
reaction. If, on the other hand, crime, like normal human
conduct, is mainly a matter of imitation, punishment fairly
239. Id. at 300–02.
240. Id. at 301.
241. Id. at 108.
242. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10, 27 (1927); see also Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72
(1942).
243. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
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may be expected to help to keep it out of fashion. The study of
criminals has been thought by some well known men of science
to sustain the former hypothesis . . . . But there is weighty
authority for the belief that, however this may be, “not the
nature of the crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal,
constitutes the only reasonable legal criterion to guide the
inevitable social reaction against the criminal.”244

No single individual did more than Holmes to reorient
American legal thinking in the late nineteenth century, switching
its emphasis from morality and redress for the past to a concern
with appropriate incentives and management of risk. But these
were hardly exclusively progressive concerns. To the contrary,
they cut across all of elite legal thought, from commercial law and
contracts to corporate law to tort theory.
D. Corporate Finance, Structure, and Governance
Another area that was powerfully affected by the marginalist
revolution was the legal theory of the corporation, particularly
corporate finance. Ideology is powerful, however, and what makes
corporate law so interesting is the way that the doctrine “flipped.”
In this case, the progressives clung to traditional, classical
theories of value, while more conservative corporate scholars
turned to forward-looking reasonable expectations theories.
Under classical corporate finance theory, the legal value of a
firm was a function of its paid-in capital, which was the amount
of cash or other property that had been placed into the
corporation at the time of its formation, plus subsequent
contributions.245 Corporate shares were issued at “par,” which
was predicated on this stated value.246 For example, if a firm had
$1,000 of paid-in capital, it could issue 100 shares of stock with a
stated par value of $10 per share, typically printed on each stock
certificate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, this
244. Id. at 458, 461, 471, 473–74.
245. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 160 (“The value of a
corporation was its paid-in capital, a backward-looking amount declared by the
stated ‘par’ value of shares.”).
246. Id. at 160.
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classical view in 1889, the stock certificate “stands in the hands
of the subscriber for so much as, and no more than, the amount
actually paid upon it.”247
Stock was said to be “watered” when the stated par value, or
par multiplied by the number of shares, was greater than the
actual paid-in capital.248 This could occur because stated capital
had simply not been paid in or—more commonly—because
noncash assets had been contributed at exaggerated evaluations.
For example, a 1907 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a penniless promoter’s unwritten play and unpatented
inventions were not worth the $2 million that the promoter
declared but were “wholly unpaid.”249 A great deal of Gilded Age
and Progressive Era literature as well as many court decisions
were concerned with claims of stock “watering.”250 The watering
metaphor was a reference to ranchers who sometimes forced
cattle to drink large amounts of water in order to inflate their
weight before auction.251 Beginning during Reconstruction and
stretching through the Gilded Age, progressive writers such as
Charles Francis Adams, persistently identified and attacked
corporate abuses that took the form of stock watering.252
247. Commonwealth v. Lehigh Ave. Rwy. Co., 129 Pa. 405, 499 (1889).
248. Id. at 161.
249. Gillett v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 82 N.E. 891, 904–05 (Ill. 1907).
250. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS
AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 21, 22, 28, 29 (2d ed. 1889) (describing
“watered” stock); 4 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 3903 (2d ed. 1910) (discussing provisions against issuance of
stock at less than par value).
251. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 59 (2007).
252. See, e.g., Charles Francis Adams, Railroad Inflation, 108 N. AM. REV.
130, 130–31 (1869) (attacking stock watering); Charles Francis Adams, The
Railroad System, 104 N. AM. REV. 476 (1867) (same); Charles Francis Adams,
Legislative Control over Railway Charters, 1 AM. L. REV. 451 (1867) (same);
Charles Francis Adams, The Erie Railroad Row, 3 AM. L. REV. 41 (1868) (same);
Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie, 109 N. AM. REV. 30–106 (1870)
(same); Charles Francis Adams, Railway Problems in 1869, 110 N. AM. REV. 116
(1870) (same); Charles Francis Adams, Railway Commissions, 2 J. SOC. SCI.
233–36 (1870) (same); Charles Francis Adams, The Government and the
Railroad Corporations, 112 N. AM. REV. 31 (1871) (same). On Adams’s career in
railroad regulation, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION ch. 1
(1984).
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To marginalist eyes, the classical theory of corporate finance
made little sense and certainly did not reflect how investors
assessed value. A corporation’s value might be close to its paid-in
capital on the day it commenced business, but soon after, it could
be worth either much more or much less, depending on how it
fared in business. In sharp contrast to the classical theory,
marginalists argued that the value of a corporation is a set of
judgments about its reasonable prospects in the market. As a
result the concept of “par” as historical paid-in capital became
meaningless. Around 1910, states began to approve the issuance
of “no-par” shares.253
One interesting thing about the marginalist thinking that
swept classical finance theory under the rug is that it came from
the political right—not from progressives, but largely from
financial interests generally aligned with large business. The
principal instigator of the new valuation methodologies was the
New York Bar, which by the Gilded Age was becoming the hub of
United States corporate finance.254 By contrast, the marginal
contribution theory of wages, discussed below, that undermined
the wage-fund doctrine came mainly from progressive or more left
leaning economists or lawyers who saw in it a rationale for either
unionization or minimum wage laws. These same progressives
resisted marginal value theories of corporate finance. Rather,
they clung to classical value theories, which enabled them to
develop their arguments against watered stock.
Although the new theory of corporate finance was far more
realistic about the determinants of corporate value, it was also
253. See James Bonbright, No-Par Stock: Its Economics and Legal Aspect, 38
Q.J. ECON. 440, 447–48 (1924) (assessing arguments in support of no-par
shares); James Bonbright, Earning Power as a Basis of Corporate
Capitalization, 35 Q.J. ECON. 482, 482–90 (1921) (criticizing the earning power
basis of capitalization). For a similar criticism, see WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY,
RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 90–91 (1915); Edward H. Warren,
Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1923). For
additional discussion, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 166–67.
254. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 78–97 (1992) (describing the development
of corporate theory); Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the
Age of American Enterprise, 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1730–1940, at 70–81 (Gerald L. Geison ed. 1983)
(discussing the role of lawyers in American enterprise from 1870 to 1920).
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more difficult for the law to control. Under the classical theory,
corporate finance could be managed by any commercially literate
judge. Whether capital had been paid in was largely a matter of
accounting. The most difficult questions concerned valuation of
paid-in noncash assets, but most judges had experience doing this
as well. By contrast, the rational expectations theory required
predictions about future performance, and the relevant variables
included the market as well as the particular firm. As a result,
along with the change from backward-looking to forward-looking
theories of corporate finance came increased calls for regulatory
control, first in the form of state “Blue Sky” laws255 and later
through federal securities regulation.256 The perceived need for
regulation of corporate financial disclosure actually emanated
from developments that occurred within the corporate bar as
much as progressive reformers.
These same forward-looking rational expectations models
also led to changing ideas about the relationship between
corporate management and shareholders. Once again, the idea
came from two different ideological directions. On the left,
progressives Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means wrote The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, a book that today is
identified with the theory that the modern large corporation is
characterized by separation of stock ownership and managerial
control.257 Berle and Means saw this separation as the source of
improper corporate power and waste.
But economists who stood much more centrally in the
neoclassical tradition also embraced separation of ownership and
255. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 365 (1991) (describing the campaign for blue sky
legislation and its support from smaller banks and state bank regulators); Paul
G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses,
46 J.L. ECON. 229, 230–32 (2003) (arguing that blue sky laws set the stage for
federal securities regulation).
256. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 168–71 (discussing the rise
of no-par stocks and the problems it posed for corporate valuation).
257. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 127–52 (1932). On the writing of The
Modern Corporation, see Thomas K. McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means,
18 REV. AM. HIST. 578, 585–90 (1990) (analyzing the influence of Berle and
Means).
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control.258 The neoclassical theory of corporate finance and
management predicated the firm as a single, rational economic
actor intent on maximizing its value. Neoclassical economic
scholarship treated the corporation as a unitary maximizing
entity. The possibly separate wishes of shareholders were either
disparaged or ignored. This line of thought began with Yale
economist Irving Fisher’s “separation theorem,” first articulated
early in the twentieth century, that the profit function of a
corporation could not be derived from the individual utility
functions of its shareholders.259 In the late 1930s, Ronald Coase’s
Nature of the Firm, written before Coase moved to the United
States, developed a complete theory of firm structure from which
the shareholder was entirely absent.260 Coase argued that a firm’s
managers decide whether to make something internally or
procure it from inside by comparing the costs of internal
production against the costs of using the market.261 The
aggregate of these decisions determines the firm’s boundaries.
Coase’s article never mentioned shareholders, who were
irrelevant to the maximizing, explicitly marginalist decisions that
Coase contemplated.262
The final elimination of the shareholder as an important
element in corporate finance and management came in the 1950s
and after, first with the development of the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem, for which its authors Franco Modigliani of MIT and
Merton Miller at the University of Chicago won the Nobel
prize.263 The theorem states that in a perfectly functioning
258.
259.

See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 172–83.
IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906); IRVING
FISHER, THE RATE OF INTEREST: ITS NATURE, DETERMINATION AND RELATION TO
ECONOMIC PHENOMENA (1907). He presented the mature theorem in IRVING
FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST AS DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE TO SPEND
INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT (1930).
260. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386
(1937).
261. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law
and Economics, supra note 131, at 539 (“[Coase] assumed that the firm seeks to
maximize its value and that both internal production and markets impose costs,
but that these costs are not necessarily the same.”).
262. See id. at 514.
263. FRANCO MODIGLIANI, 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FRANCO MODIGLIANI
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market for corporate finance the value of the firm is invariant to
its ratio of equity to debt.264 The implication was that stock
“ownership” was really nothing more than an alternative way of
supplying capital to the corporation.
The nineteenth century idea of the shareholder as actively
involved in corporate decision making had lost its vitality except
as to very large shareholders. The development of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) in subsequent years further
diminished the role of the shareholder as active and interested
investor. Under rational expectations theory, random choice
works just as well as extensive research, for the result of the
research would be reflected in the stock price already.265 The
extreme result today is the index fund, in which the average
shareholder knows almost nothing about the corporations whose
shares he owns—cannot name their CEOs or perhaps even
identify the products that they manufacture.266 This neoclassical
vision of separation of ownership and control was far more
extreme than anything that Berle and Means had ever
contemplated. It was also just as clearly not a part of classical
legal thought.

xiii (Andrew Abel ed., 1980); see also Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 261, 264, 295–96 (1958) (providing the theorem that suggests that
there is a remarkably small difference between the cost of equity funds and debt
funds); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 411–15 (1961) (examining the effect of
dividend policy on a firm’s share price).
264. See MODIGLIANI, supra note 140, at xiii (“[T]he market value of the
firm—debt plus equity—depends only on the income stream generated by its
assets.”).
265. See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS.
34, 39 (1965) (“[I]f there are many astute traders in the market, on the average
the full effects of new information on intrinsic values will be reflected nearly
instantaneously in actual prices.”). On the history, see MICHAEL C. JENSEN &
CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR., THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2–20
(1984); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970). Fama won the Nobel Prize in 2013.
266. HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 183.
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E. The Labor Problem

In labor law, by contrast to corporate finance, progressive
reformers took up the marginalist position, while traditionalists
clung to classical views. The classical theory of wages was
expressed in the “wage-fund doctrine,” developed most
extensively in the work of David Ricardo and culminating in the
writing of John Stuart Mill until he abruptly rejected it late in
life.267 Under the wage-fund theory the rate of wages was thought
to be a function of the surplus remaining from production and
sale during the previous business period. During each business
cycle, a firm produced, sold, and paid wages and return on
capital. The surplus that remained after these payments were
made was a “fund” that could be used to pay wages during the
subsequent period.268 This surplus had to be divided among the
workers and thus determined both the number that could be
hired and the rate they could be paid.269 A firm could pay more
only by exhausting the surplus and borrowing against the future.
This would produce business distress, failure, and unemployment
and starvation for the workers. As a result, everyone, including
the workers themselves, had an interest in ensuring that the
aggregate amount of wages paid in a second period did not exceed
the surplus left over from the previous period.
267. See John S. Mill, Book Review, in 5 COLLECTED WORKS 680 (J. Robson
ed., 1967) (reviewing W. T. THORNTON, ON LABOUR, ITS WRONGFUL CLAIMS AND
RIGHTFUL DUES, ITS ACTUAL PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (1869)); Robert B.
Ekelund, Jr., A Short-Run Classical Model of Capital and Wages: Mill’s
Recantation of the Wages Fund, 28 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 66, 79–84 (1976)
(examining Mill’s recantation of the wage-fund doctrine); Edwin G. West & Rik
W. Hafer, J.S. Mill, Unions, and the Wages Fund Recantation: A
Reinterpretation, 92 Q.J. ECON. 603 (1978) (arguing that Mill changed his view
on the wages fund). For more on this subject, see the book by British feminist
and suffrage advocate MILLICENT GARRETT FAWCETT, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR
BEGINNERS 113 (1876) (“Wages depend on the proportion between the wagesfund and the number of the labouring population. If this proportion remains
unchanged, the average rate of wages cannot be raised.”).
268. See ANTONELLA STIRATI, THE THEORY OF WAGES IN CLASSICAL
ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF ADAM SMITH, DAVID RICARDO, AND THEIR
CONTEMPORARIES 177–79 (Joan Hall trans., 1994) (detailing the development of
wage-fund theory).
269. See id. at 178 (“The real wage is flexible and is equal to the wage fund
divided by the active working population.”).

PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THOUGHT

699

American political economists in the classical tradition
generally supported the wage-fund theory.270 Arthur Latham
Perry, an American economist at Williams College, explained the
theory in the mid-nineteenth century, calling attention to its antistatist and anti-union implications:
That which pays for labor in every country, is a certain portion
of actually accumulated capital, which cannot be increased by
the proposed action of government, nor by the influence of
public opinion, nor by combinations among the workmen
themselves. There is also in every country a certain number of
laborers, and this number cannot be diminished by the
proposed action of government, nor by public opinion, nor by
combinations among themselves. There is to be a division now
among all these laborers of the portion of capital actually there
present.271

Perry’s vision of the “iron law of wages,” as it was sometimes
called, confirmed that both government minimum wage laws and
union activity would be useless and affirmatively harmful.
Neither could raise wages beyond the amount that the fund made
available. If they attempted to do so, the result would be firm
bankruptcy and unemployment.
By the Gilded Age, however, some American political
economists were seeing important qualifications. The history of
Brown University President Francis Wayland’s highly influential
textbook in political economy illustrates the changes. It was
originally published in 1837 and stated an orthodox version of the
wage-fund theory, very likely taken from David Ricardo.272
Wayland’s book went through many editions and was continued
after his death in 1865 by Aaron L. Chapin, an important
economist in his own right and also the founding President of
Beloit College. Chapin acknowledged in his preface to the 1879
270. See, e.g., HENRY CAREY, ESSAY ON THE RATE OF WAGES 30–32 (1835)
(“The division of produce is . . . regulated by the supply of labour in the
market . . . .”); SAMUEL NEWMAN, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 254 (1835)
(“The tendency then of an excess of population, must be to diminish the rate of
wages . . . .”).
271. ARTHUR LATHAM PERRY, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 122 (1866).
272. See FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 142
(1837) (“But then, just as we increase the proportion of labor to capital, we
diminish the wages of labor.”).
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edition of Wayland’s Political Economy that he had read Jevons,
the English marginalist.273 He then proceeded to develop an early
marginal utility theory of wages. The real value of wages, he
wrote, was anticipated production—“a hopeful opportunity for
increasing wealth by the profits of production.”274 To that end, the
employer did not actually draw money out of any previously
accumulated fund. “More likely what is needed for wages will be
borrowed from the bank, in anticipation of coming sales.”275 In his
1881 lectures on political economy, prepared for his classes at
Johns Hopkins and Michigan, Henry Carter Adams took the
same position,276 as did Francis Amasa Walker of MIT.277
Some American traditionalists such as Yale’s William
Graham Sumner defended the wage-fund theory right through
the Gilded Age by mocking emergent marginalism’s expected
value theories. The marginal productivity theory of wages, he
scoffed, imagined “that a man who was tilling the ground in June
could eat the crop he expected to have in September, or that a tailor
could be wearing the coat which he was making.”278
Of course, Sumner was missing the point. The fact that the
rate of wages depends on expected marginal contribution of the
laborer did not mean that the contribution must already be in the
bank before a salary check could be written. It was not the
existence of the money but the rational expectation that it would
come that drove the marginal contribution theory of wages.
Sumner’s objection only served to illustrate classical political
economy’s inability to see value as capitalization of future
expectations.
273.
274.
275.
276.

FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY iii (1879).
Id. at 170.
Id.
See HENRY CARTER ADAMS, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY 61–62 (1881) (criticizing wage-fund doctrine).
277. See Francis A. Walker, The Doctrine of Rent, and the Residual
Claimant Theory of Wages, 5 Q.J. ECON. 417, 421 (1891) (“[I]f [the laborer]
vigorously asserts his interests, he can continuously raise his stipulated wages
to the full height of his increased efficiency in production.”); Francis A. Walker,
The Source of Business Profits, 1 Q.J. ECON. 265 (1887) (rejecting wage-fund
theory in favor of marginalism).
278. William G. Sumner, Wages, in COLLECTED ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 36, 50 (1885).
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By the turn of the century, marginalist economists were
uniformly seeing wages as determined by rational expectations
concerning employee contribution. John Bates Clark wrote a
highly generalized argument that in a competitive market, the
value of every factor of production, including labor, would be its
marginal productivity.279 For each worker, wages were limited by
that worker’s marginal contribution to the employer. If a worker’s
labor promised to increase firm value by twenty-five cents per
hour, then the employer would pay any wage up to that amount.
If it paid less, it could retain the excess as a surplus, but it would
stop hiring rather than pay more.
This “marginal productivity” theory of wages completely
upended the classical wage-fund theory, and many young
marginalist economists in the United States cut their teeth
developing its various implications, including criticism of
Supreme Court decisions that struck down minimum wage
laws.280 For example, George G. Groat, an economist from the
University of Vermont, attacked the Supreme Court’s 1923
Adkins decision in the Yale Law Journal. He contrasted the
“legal wage” theory, which he identified with the wages fund and
economic substantive due process, with the “economic wage,”
which he identified with the marginal utility theory.281 Under
that theory “marginal men get what they produce.”282
The wage-fund theory very likely explained both the Lochner
era judicial hostility toward statutory wage and hours regulation,
but also the commonly recognized exception for public
employees.283 Public employers did not pay wages out of
279. John Bates Clark, Wages and Interest as Determined by Marginal
Productivity, 10 J. POL. ECON. 105 (1901).
280. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at 193–98.
281. See George G. Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J.
489, 494 (1924) (discussing Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
For a good contemporary account of the passing of the doctrine, see LEWIS
HENRY HANEY, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 516–24 (rev. ed. 1920). Haney
was a conservative, and at the time was an economist at NYU.
282. Groat, supra note 281, at 491 (relying on JOHN BATES CLARK, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, chs. 7, 8 (1899)).
283. See, e.g., Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (upholding eight-hour
law for state employees); Sweeten v. State, 122 Md. 634, 90 A. 180 (1914)
(upholding hours regulation of state employees); Elkan v. State, 122 Md. 642, 90
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accumulated earnings but rather out of government
appropriations, financed by tax dollars rather than earnings. As a
result the wage-fund doctrine did not apply to them.
As Groat’s essay reflected, for more progressive leaning
marginalists an important corollary of the new marginal
productivity theory was that labor, particularly unskilled labor,
was not getting its fair share of production. Under perfect
competition every factor of production, including labor, would
earn its “marginal net product.” But that was where the rub came
in. A broad consensus believed that most employer markets were
much less competitive than most labor markets. As a result,
wages tend to be lower than marginal productivity and often were
driven to subsistence levels. These effects were most severe
among labor unions that served unskilled workers, who were both
plentiful and mobile. They were less severe in more specialized
trades.284
Not everyone shared these policy views, however. Some
believed that both production and labor were competitive, and
wages should be wherever free market bargaining placed them.285
Further, the free flow of labor would incline it to move to its
highest value level. But the important point is that the battle line
was drawn in a very different place than the classical–
progressive dichotomy would suggest. Even among those who
opposed minimum wage law and unions, the wage-fund doctrine
had no place.
F. Social Policy and the Distribution of Wealth
Between roughly 1880 and 1940, marginalist social (welfare)
economics moved from the political left to the right. The early
marginalists believed that interpersonal comparisons of utility
were possible. Because wealth has declining marginal utility,
A. 183 (Md. 1914), aff’d, 239 U.S. 634 (1915) (following Sweeten); Malette v. City
of Spokane, 1 P. 496 (Wash. 1913) (same).
284. HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 269–70.
285. See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM 32–33 (1995) (providing Williams Graham
Sumner’s view of wages).
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total welfare would be greater as wealth was more evenly
distributed. Redistribution entailed that wealthier persons, who
valued the marginal dollar by less because they already had so
many, would give up much less in welfare than the poor
recipients, for whom each dollar provided much more utility.
These ideas were accepted, although sometimes qualified, by
British marginalists William Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall,286
and Arthur Cecil Pigou.287 They were also embraced by
mainstream American economists, including Frank Taussig
(Harvard), John Bates Clark (Columbia), Simon Patten (Penn,
Wharton Business School), Jacob Viner (Chicago), Irving Fisher
(Yale), and Edwin R.A. Seligman (Columbia).288 They obtained
more limited traction in legal policy making, but are strongly
reflected in the debates leading to the modern progressive income
tax.289
For most mainstream neoclassicists, the “ordinalist
revolution” of the mid-thirties changed these views rather
decisively. British economists Lionel Robbins and later John
Hicks argued that interpersonal comparison of utilities was a
286. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 206 (3d ed. 1895)
(“[A] pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary poor man is a much greater
thing than a pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary rich man.”). Marshall
did not make the same claim in his first edition.
287. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 89 (4th ed. 1932)
(“[T]ransference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of
similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the
expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction.”).
288. See 1 FRANK WILLIAM TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 132 (3d ed. 1921)
(“[I]nequality of incomes brings a less sum of human happiness than equality of
incomes.”); John Bates Clark, The Ultimate Standard of Value, 1 YALE REV. 258,
258 (1893) (discussing the social nature of value); Simon N. Patten, The Scope of
Political Economy, 2 YALE REV. 264, 265 (1894) (discussing the theory of marginal
utility); Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics (pts. 1 &
2), 33 J. POL. ECON. 369, 638, 644 (1925) (“Changes in the relative distribution of
income as between different classes will bring about changes in the amount of
welfare, even though the aggregate real income of the community remains the
same.”); Irving Fisher, A Statistical Method for Measuring “Marginal Utility”
and Testing the Justice of a Progressive Income Tax, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS
CONTRIBUTED IN HONOR OF JOHN BATES CLARK 157–93 (J.H. Hollander ed., 1927);
Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 PUB. AM.
ECON. ASS’N 1, 132–33 (1894).
289. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 98–103 (describing the
influence of marginalist theory on early progressive taxation debates).
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scientific impossibility. Doing them required cardinal assessment
of states of mind, which are fundamentally noncomparable. As a
result, any statement about the welfare effects of an involuntary
wealth transfer was purely “normative,” not scientific.290 From
that point on, neoclassical welfare economics developed its ideas
of efficiency mainly from Pareto, which eliminated the need for
interpersonal utility comparisons. In the process, however, the
new welfare economics very largely removed questions about the
distribution of wealth from economic science.291
While the ordinalist revolution deeply affected mainstream
economics, it never produced complete consensus. More leftleaning economists in particular have resisted the implication
that questions about the distribution of wealth are purely
normative, particularly as they relate to productivity rather than
consumption.292 In addition, American institutionalist economists
largely ignored the ordinalist revolution. By the mid-1930s when
Robbins wrote, institutionalism was being expelled from
mainstream economics. Its mantle was picked up by the Legal
Realists, however, who effectively became the “legal division” of
institutionalism. The result was a sharp division between legal
policy and neoclassical welfare economics that dominated
government welfare policy through the 1970s.293
Today, the economic battle over the role of the state in
wealth distribution has very little to do with the division between
290. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF
ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2d ed. 1935); JOHN HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1939); see
also HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 111–13 (discussing Robbins’s and
Hicks’s views that interpersonal comparisons of utility were impossible).
291. E.g., I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1950); see
Kenneth Arrow, Little’s Critique of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 923
(1951) (providing a review of Little). Under the Pareto principle, a policy is
efficient only if no one opposes it; as a result interpersonal utility comparisons
are unnecessary; under a “potential Pareto” potential (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) a
policy is efficient if the gainers gain enough to compensate the losers fully—thus
in effect creating a Pareto improvement if compensation were to occur. Once
again, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not necessary.
292. E.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014);
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012).
293. HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 110–22 (examining the
relationship between institutional economics and legal realism).
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classical and progressive legal thought and not much to do with
Social Darwinism either. Rather, within economic and policy
circles, it divides economists who are all marginalist but who
nevertheless have very different views about the relationship of
incentive, public support, wealth distribution, consumption, and
productivity.
IV. Conclusion
With its forward-looking theories of value and rational
decision making, economic marginalism was a world-changing
idea. So was Darwin in the biological and social sciences. By the
1920s these ideas had overrun Western thought, including
American legal thought. Progressives were an important part of
those who experienced and embraced these changes, but they
were only a part. Our legal and policy past was not so much a
conflict between classical and progressive legal thought, as a
debate about how to accommodate important changes in scientific
and economic world view that nearly every educated person
accepted. Classical legal thought vanished in the process, never
to return.

